Knowledge Flow Analysis for Security Protocols by Torlak, Emina et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
60
51
09
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
4 M
ay
 20
06
Knowledge Flow Analysis for Security Protocols
Emina Torlak, Marten van Dijk, Blaise Gassend, Daniel Jackson, and Srinivas Devadas
{emina, marten, gassend, dnj, devadas}@mit.edu
October 9, 2018
Abstract
Knowledge flow analysis offers a simple and flexible way to find flaws in security protocols. A
protocol is described by a collection of rules constraining the propagation of knowledge amongst princi-
pals. Because this characterization corresponds closely to informal descriptions of protocols, it allows a
succinct and natural formalization; because it abstracts away message ordering, and handles communica-
tions between principals and applications of cryptographic primitives uniformly, it is readily represented
in a standard logic. A generic framework in the Alloy modelling language is presented, and instantiated
for two standard protocols, and a new key management scheme.
1 Introduction
One area of major successes for formal methods has been the verification of security protocols. A number of
specialized tools have been developed in the last decade that have exposed subtle flaws in existing protocols
(see, e.g. [12; 29]). For the most part, however, these tools have been used by the researchers that developed
them, and less attention has been paid to usability issues.
This paper presents a new approach to formulating and checking cryptographic protocols. It does not
enable any new form of analysis. Instead, it makes verification more accessible to the designers of protocols.
Its key contribution is a new characterization of these protocols that is both closer to how designers conceive
them, and amenable to a more direct encoding in standard first-order logic. This more direct encoding allows
existing tools to be applied as black boxes without modification; it requires no tweaking of parameters or
issuing of special directives by the user. Moreover, because the semantic gap between informal descriptions
of protocols and their formalization is smaller, there are fewer opportunities for errors to creep in.
In this paper, the Alloy modeling language is used to record the details of the protocol and its security
goals, and the Alloy Analyzer is used to find flaws. The approach, however, requires no special features of
Alloy or its analysis, and could be applied in the context of any formal method based on first-order logic.
Its simplicity suggests that it may be useful in teaching; indeed, using the approach, we have explained
cryptographic protocols to undergraduates who have had only a few weeks of experience in formal methods.
Our approach, which we call knowledge flow analysis, gives a uniform framework for expressing the
actions of principals, assumptions on intruders, and properties of cryptographic primitives. The dynamic
behaviour of the protocol is described by an initial state of knowledge, and a collection of rules that dictate
how knowledge may flow amongst principals. A state is given by a relation mapping principals to the values
they know; the allowable knowledge flows can thus be succinctly described as a standard transition relation
on knowledge states, written as a constraint.
This simple setup allows us to model a range of intruder capabilities and to detect replay, parallel session,
type flaw, and binding attacks. We have applied it to both symmetric and public-key cryptography under the
Dolev-Yao [16] approach. The modeling framework itself is more general, however, and can be extended
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to include the properties of cryptographic primitives [10; 14; 33; 42] and an unbounded number of sessions
with bounded messages [11].
This approach grew out of an effort to check a new cryptographic scheme [20; 21]. Knowledge flow
analysis described here was the final result of a series of incremental attempts at formalizing and checking
the protocol using the Alloy language and tool. This process helped crystallize our intuitions, and drew out a
number of important assumptions. The final analysis, although only performed over a finite domain, actually
establishes the correctness of the protocol for unbounded instantiations because of a special property of this
protocol. The Alloy models developed for this case study were generalized into a simple framework that
was subsequently applied to some standard protocols, such as Needham-Schroeder [36] and Otway-Rees
[40].
The contributions of this paper are:
1. the knowledge flow formalism, which characterizes the dynamic behaviour of a cryptographic pro-
tocol in terms of the increasing knowledge of the principals, avoiding the need to impose an explicit
ordering on messages;
2. a realization in the Alloy modelling language as a generic framework with a library of primitives that
can be easily instantiated for a variety of protocols;
3. soundness and completeness results that guarantee that (1) any counterexample generated by the an-
alyzer to a security theorem is legitimate, and not an artifact of the modelling framework, formalism
or analysis; and (2) that if a counterexample exists involving any number of message exchanges and
any number of steps, it will be found, so long as the number of parallel sessions is within a prescribed
bound;
4. case study applications of the approach to two well-known protocols, one of which (Needham-
Schroeder) is explained in detail, and to a new key management scheme based on controlled physical
random functions [20; 21].
Section 2 explains the key intuitions underlying the approach, using Needham Schroeder as an example.
Section 3 shows the complete formalization of this example, including the statement of the security goal, and
a discussion of the counterexample corresponding to the well-known attack. Section 4 gives a mathematical
summary of the approach without reference to any particular modeling language that might serve as a basis
for implementations in other tools, and which makes precise the assumptions underlying the model. The
paper closes with an evaluation and a discussion of related work.
2 Knowledge Flow Basics
The key idea behind knowledge flow analysis is the observation that, at the most basic level, the purpose
of a security protocol is to distribute knowledge among its legitimate participants. A protocol is flawed
if it allows an intruder to learn a value that is intended to remain strictly within the legitimate principals’
pool of knowledge. To gain more intuition about knowledge flows in security applications, consider the
Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol [36] shown in Figure 1.
We have two principals, Alice and Bob, each of whom has an initial pool of knowledge represented
with white boxes. Alice’s initial knowledge, for example, consists of her own public/private key pair
PK(A)/SK(A), identity A, nonce NA, and Bob’s public key PK(B) and identity B. The purpose of
the protocol is to distribute the nonces between Alice and Bob in such a way that the following conditions
hold at the end: (1) Alice and Bob both know NA and NB , and (2) no other principal knows the nonces.
2
BOBALICE
E(PKB : A, NA) 
NA 
E(PKB : A, NA) 
E(PKB : A, NA) 
E(PKA : NA, NB) 
A NAPKA
SKA
PKB
B
NB
PKB
SKB
PKA
B A
E(PKA : NA, NB) 
E(PKA : NA, NB) 
E(PKB : NB) 
NB 
E(PKB : NB) 
E(PKB : NB) 
Figure 1: Knowledge Flow in Needham-Schroeder Protocol
To initiate the protocol, Alice first expands her pool of knowledge to include EPK(B)(A,NA), an en-
cryption of her identity and nonce with Bob’s public key. She then sends the cipher to Bob who decrypts it
using his private key, SK(B). At the end of the first step of the protocol, each principal’s knowledge has
increased to include the values in light gray boxes. Bob performs the second step of the protocol by adding
EPK(A)(NA, NB) to his current knowledge and sending the cipher to Alice. She uses her private key to
decrypt Bob’s message and extract NB . By using NB and PK(B), Alice can set up an authenticated and
private channel with Bob as is done during the final step of the protocol in which Alice creates EPK(B)(NB)
and forwards it to Bob. Both Alice and Bob now know the two nonces and share all other knowledge except
their secret keys.
Following the flow of knowledge in the Needham-Schroeder protocol provides a crucial insight under-
lying our analysis method. Namely, a principal can learn a value in one of three ways; he can
· draw the value at the start,
· compute it using his current knowledge, or
· learn it by communication.
Our analysis treats the latter two ways of obtaining knowledge as equivalent. Specifically, we can think of
Alice’s computing EPK(B)(A,NA) as her learning it from a principal called Encryptor whose initial pool
of values includes all possible ciphers: Alice sends the tuple (PK(B), (A,NA)) to Encryptor who responds
by sending back the encryption of (A,NA) with PK(B).
Treating cryptographic primitives as principals allows us to consider the total pool of knowledge to be
fixed. That is, the set of all values before and after the execution of a security protocol is the same; the only
difference is the distribution of those values among the principals. Since we assume that principals never
forget values, the set of principals who know a value at the end of a protocol session subsumes the set of
principals who drew the value at the beginning.
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The goal of analyzing knowledge flows in a protocol is to verify that particular values never leak out of
the honest participants’ pool of knowledge. In other words, we are interested in analyzing the flow of knowl-
edge from an intruder’s perspective. This observation allows us to make sound simplifying assumptions that
drastically reduce the effort needed to formalize a protocol in terms of knowledge flows:
· We need not encode the flows of knowledge among the honest principals, such as the flow which
allows Alice to learn EPK(A)(NA, NB) from Encryptor. Rather, we may assume that each honest
principal draws all values in the total knowledge pool and specify protocols solely in terms of the
intruders’ knowledge flows (sections 4.1 and 4.2).
· We may model all adversaries, including the untrusted public network, with a single opponent whom
we call Oscar. The soundness of this approach is formally proved in section 4.3. Intuitively, the ap-
proach makes sense if we note that the potential adversaries will be most effective when they collabo-
rate and share knowledge among themselves. Hence, we can replace the (collaboration of) adversaries
with a single principal who possesses all their knowledge, without excluding any intrusion scenarios.
In our example, the flow of knowledge from the intruder’s perspective starts with the protocol initial-
ization message EPK(B)(A,NA), since Oscar needs no prior knowledge to learn the first cipher that Alice
sends to Bob. In general, because Oscar includes the untrusted public network, he learns the first message
of the protocol for free, regardless of who its intended recipient and sender are:
∀p∈{a,b},p′∈{a,b}∪O [∅ → EPK(p′)(I(p), N(ǫ, I(p)))]. (1)
The variables a and b denote the honest principals (Alice and Bob), and the set O stands for Oscar. The
notation N(ǫ, I(p)) represents the nonce that the nonce primitive N generated for the principal identified
by I(p) using the random value ǫ as the seed. For example, Alice’s identity is I(a) = A and Alice’s
nonce is N(ǫ, I(a)) = NA. The empty set means that Oscar does not need prior knowledge to learn
EPK(p′)(I(p), N(ǫ, I(p))).
Once his pool of knowledge includes EPK(B)(A,NA), Oscar learns the corresponding response, EPK(A)(NA, NB).
More generally1,
∀p′∈{a,b},p∈{a,b}∪O,v∈V [c→ EPK(p)(v,N(c, I(p
′)))] (2)
where c = EPK(p′)(I(p), v).
The variable V denotes the set of all values, or the fixed pool of knowledge. Note that our formalization
constrains the seed of Bob’s nonce to be Alice’s initialization message. This is needed to establish that
Bob’s nonce was generated in the context of the protocol session started by Alice with EPK(B)(A,NA).
The resulting correspondence between the nonces prevents our analysis from sounding false alarms when
Oscar legitimately obtains two nonces from Alice and Bob by running a valid protocol session with each.
Oscar learns the final message, EPK(B)(NB), as a consequence of knowing EPK(A)(NA, NB). For-
mally,
∀p∈{a,b},p′∈{a,b}∪O,v∈V[
{EPK(p)(N(ǫ, I(p)), v))} → EPK(p′)(v)
]
. (3)
1We use the parameter v in c instead of N(ǫ, I(p)) because p′, the recipient of c, cannot conclusively determine that v is, in
fact, the nonce N(ǫ, I(p)).
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3 Example
The Needham-Schroeder protocol is vulnerable to a parallel session attack discovered by Gavin Lowe [28].
This section presents a knowledge flow analysis of the protocol that reproduces Lowe’s results, and gives
a flavor of the expressiveness and simplicity of our method. We have encoded the knowledge flows in the
Alloy modelling language [26] and used the Alloy Analyzer [25] to find the attack. However, the modelling
pattern presented here is applicable to any first-order logic with relations and transitive closure.
3.1 Encoding Basic Entities and Relations
The basic components of a knowledge flow model are the sets Principal and V alue, and the relations
draws, learns, and knows (Model Excerpt 1).
Model Excerpt 1 Generic Model of Principals and Values
1 module kf/basicdeclarations
2
3 abstract sig Value {}
4 sig CompositeValue extends Value {}
5 sig AtomicValue extends Value {}
6
7 abstract sig Principal {
8 draws: set Value,
9 owns: set draws
10 }{ no owns & (Principal - this).@owns }
11
12 sig HonestUser extends Principal {
13 }{ draws = Value }
14
15 one sig Oscar extends Principal {
16 knows: set Value,
17 learns: knows->knows
18 }{ no ˆlearns & iden }
19
20 pred InitialKnowledge() {
21 no CompositeValue & Oscar.draws }
22
23 pred FinalKnowledge() {
24 all v: Value |
25 v in (Oscar.draws).*(Oscar.learns) iff
26 v in Oscar.knows }
The set Principal includes all principals in a protocol – the legitimate protocol participants, represented
by the subset HonestUser, and the intruders, represented by Oscar. The set V alue models the fixed pool
of knowledge on which a protocol operates. We distinguish between AtomicV alues, which are uninter-
preted, and CompositeV alues, which may consist of other values and are learned by communicating with
cryptographic primitives. In the example from Figure 1, Alice and Bob are members of HonestUser;
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V alue consists of the union of values enclosed in the boxes ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’; the identifiers A and B are
AtomicV alues, and the ciphers are CompositeV alues.
The relation draws (line 8) maps each principal to the set of values known by that principal at the
beginning of the protocol. For example, both Alice and Bob draw Alice’s identity A at the start of the
protocol session shown in Figure 1. The declaration of owns (line 9) together with the constraint on line
10 relate a principal to the set of drawn values which uniquely identify him. Bob, for instance, owns his
identity, B, even though both he and Alice draw it.
The field knows (line 16) defines the set of all values that Oscar can learn by using the knowledge
flows available to him; this includes the knowledge obtainable from both the protocol rules and the cryp-
tographic primitives. The acyclic relation learns (lines 17-18) encodes the partial ordering on Oscar’s
maximal knowledge, enforced by the flows from which the knowledge was acquired. For example, the pro-
tocol rule 2 specifies that Oscar learns EPK(A)(NA, NB) from EPK(B)(A,NA). Hence, Oscar.knows
contains both ciphers and Oscar.learns includes the mapping
〈EPK(B)(A,NA), EPK(A)(NA, NB)〉.
The predicate InitialKnowledge states that Oscar may not draw any composite values. Rather, he
must learn them from the protocol rules or the primitives. The predicate FinalKnowledge specifies that
Oscar’s maximal knowledge contains a value v if and only if Oscar draws v or he learns it from a knowledge
flow originating in his initial knowledge.
3.2 Modelling Cryptographic Primitives
The Needham-Schroeder protocol requires the use of cryptographic primitives to encrypt/decrypt messages
and generate nonces. Our encoding of the knowledge flows and values associated with these primitives is
shown in Model Excerpt 2. Note that we do not explicitly model primitives as principals. Instead, we define
the pools of values drawn by the primitives as signatures and encode their input/output behavior as predi-
cates. For example, the initial knowledge of Encryptor is given by the set Ciphertext, and Encryptor’s
operation is encoded in the predicates Encryptor and Decryptor.
A Ciphertext represents an encryption of a non-empty plaintext (line 31) with a given key (line 32).
The predicate Encryptor formalizes the encryption knowledge flow from Oscar’s perspective. It states
that, in order to learn the cipher v from the Encryptor, Oscar must provide the input x consisting of the
plaintext and the key associated with v. Similarly, the predicate Decryptor stipulates that Oscar can learn
the plaintext v after he presents the input x consisting of an encryption of v and the corresponding decryption
key.
Note that this model of ciphers accommodates both public and symmetric key encryption. Symmetric
key encryption is the default; invoking the predicate PublicKeyCryptography switches on public key
encryption. Any atomic value owned by a principal can serve as his public/private key pair. The public
portion of any principal’s key is accessible to Oscar through the draws relation. The decryption constraint
on line 42 ensures that Oscar can decrypt a message only if he owns the value representing the public/private
key pair.
Nonces are encoded as composites with two fields, seed and id. The field id stores the identity of the
principal to whom the nonce was issued. The predicate NonceGenerator says that, from Oscar’s point
of view, the generator will issue a nonce labeled with Oscar’s identifier when presented with the input seed
x.
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Model Excerpt 2 Cryptographic Values and Primitives
27 module kf/primitives/encryption
28 open kf/basicdeclarations
29
30 sig Ciphertext extends CompositeValue {
31 plaintext: some Value,
32 key: Value }
33
34 pred PublicKeyCryptography() {
35 Ciphertext.key in Principal.owns & AtomicValue }
36
37 pred Encryptor(x: set Value, v : Value) {
38 v in Ciphertext && x = v.key + v.plaintext }
39
40 pred Decryptor(x: set Value, v : Value) {
41 some c : plaintext.v | x = (c.key + c) &&
42 (PublicKeyCryptography() =>
43 c.key in Oscar.owns) }
44
45 pred PerfectCryptography() {
46 (all disj c1,c2: Ciphertext | c1.plaintext !=
47 c2.plaintext || c1.key != c2.key)
48 (all c : Ciphertext | c != c.key &&
49 c != c.plaintext) }
.
.
.
50 module kf/primitives/nonces
51 open kf/basicdeclarations
52
53 sig Nonce extends CompositeValue {
54 seed : Value,
55 id : Value }
56
57 pred NonceGenerator(x: set Value, v : Value) {
58 v in Nonce && v.id in Oscar.owns && x = v.seed }
3.3 Modelling Protocol Rules
The models presented so far are a part of a generic Alloy framework developed for analyzing knowledge
flows. This section describes the values and rules specific to the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
Principals’ identifiers are modelled as atomic values contained in the set Identity (Model Excerpt 3,
line 64). Each principal owns an Identity (67), which also doubles as its owners’ public/private key pairs
(68).
The ProtocolRules predicate (line 74) embeds the knowledge flow rules given by equations 1-3
into first-order logic. The predicate ApplyRules states that the learns relation may map the set of values
x to the value v if and only if the protocol or primitive rules define a knowledge flow from x to v.
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Model Excerpt 3 Needham-Schroeder Protocol
59 module kf/needham schroeder
60 open kf/basicdeclarations
61 open kf/primitives/encryption
62 open kf/primitives/nonces
63
64 sig Identity extends AtomicValue {}
65
66 pred IdentitiesAreKeys() {
67 all p : Principal | some p.owns & Identity &&
68 Ciphertext.key in Identity }
69
70 pred PrimitiveRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
71 Encryptor(x,v) || Decryptor(x,v) ||
72 NonceGenerator(x,v) }
73
74 pred ProtocolRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
75 v in Ciphertext && {
76 (x : some Oscar.draws &&
77 let text = v.plaintext, n = text & Nonce |
78 #text = 2 && one n && n.seed in AtomicValue &&
79 n.id = text & Identity) ||
80 (x : one Ciphertext && (some n : seed.x |
81 #x.plaintext = 2 && v.key in x.plaintext &&
82 n.id = x.key &&
83 v.plaintext = (x.plaintext - v.key) + n)) ||
84 (x : one Ciphertext &&
85 (some n : id.(x.key) & Nonce |
86 #x.plaintext = 2 && n in x.plaintext &&
87 v.plaintext = x.plaintext - n)) }}
88
89 pred ApplyRules() {
90 all v : Value | let x = Oscar.learns.v |
91 some x <=> PrimitiveRules(x, v) ||
92 ProtocolRules(x, v) }
3.4 Checking Security
The predicate SecurityAssumptions in Model Excerpt 4 models our assumptions about the properties
of cryptographic primitives and principals. We assume perfect public key cryptography (line 94) and the use
of identifiers as public/private key pairs (line 95).
The security property that the protocol should satisfy is given by the predicate SecurityTheorem. It
states that Oscar’s maximal knowledge never contains two nonces, nA and nB, such that nB is generated
by Bob in response to a protocol initialization message sent by Alice (a cipher containing Alice’s identity
and one of her nonces). The assertion Security stitches the model together to stipulate that the security
8
property should hold if Oscar obtains his maximal knowledge by applying the knowledge flow rules to the
values he draws.
Model Excerpt 4 Security Assumptions and Theorem
93 pred SecurityAssumptions() {
94 PerfectCryptography() && PublicKeyCryptography()
95 IdentitiesAreKeys() }
96
97 pred SecurityTheorem() {
98 no disj Alice, Bob : HonestUser,
99 nA, nB : Oscar.knows & Nonce |
100 nA.id in Alice.owns && nB.id in Bob.owns &&
101 (some c : Ciphertext | nB.seed = c &&
102 c.key = nB.id &&
103 c.plaintext = nA.id + nA) }
104
105 assert Security {
106 InitialKnowledge() && FinalKnowledge() &&
107 SecurityAssumptions() && ApplyRules() =>
108 SecurityTheorem() }
The Alloy Analyzer generates a counterexample to the Security assertion (Figure 2) that is a knowl-
edge flow representation of the parallel session attack discovered by Lowe [28]. Alice uses cipher0 to
initiate the protocol with Oscar, who extracts nA and forwards it to Bob in cipher1. Thinking that he is au-
thenticating with Alice, Bob responds with cipher2 which Oscar simply forwards to Alice. She completes
the session with Oscar by sending him nB, which she believes is his nonce, in cipher3. Oscar now knows
both nA and nB, contrary to our claim.
Figure 2: Parallel Session Attack on the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
4 Knowledge Flow Analysis
Knowledge flow analysis is based on a simple mathematical foundation. This section formalizes the ideas
outlined in the discussion of knowledge flow basics. We describe how communication rules direct knowl-
edge flows (4.1), show that our treatment of primitives ensures a fixed pool of values (4.2), formulate the
analysis problem in terms of Oscar’s knowledge flows (4.3), and present a small-model theorem which
makes our analysis complete for a bounded number of parallel protocol sessions (4.4).
4.1 Communicating Knowledge
We denote the sets of all principals and values by P and V . A subset of P × V is a state of knowledge
drawn from K = 2P×V , the set of all possible states of knowledge. For a given state of knowledge k ∈ K ,
9
we say that “p knows v” if (p, v) ∈ k.
Definition 1 A tuple (R, k0) is a knowledge flow for (P, V ) directed by the communication rules R ⊆
P × V × P ×K and originating from the state k0 ∈ K .
A communication rule describes the conditions under which one principal may gain knowledge from an-
other. For example, the rule (e,EPK(pb)(v), pa, {(pa, PK(pb)), (pa, v)}) states that the encryptor e will tell
the cipher EPK(b)(v)) to the principal pa if pa knows pb’s public key and the plaintext v.
Note that our definition of a communication rule limits the class of protocols expressible in the knowl-
edge flow framework. In particular, our rules cannot be used to specify conditions under which information
is withheld from a principal, such as “a will not tell v to b if b knows x”. Although many practical protocols
do not require this form of expressiveness, withholding of knowledge is an essential concept in systems that
use certificates: revoking a certificate requires withholding of information. We are working on reformu-
lating the certificate revocation problem using valid and invalid certificate sets, which should allow us to
circumvent this limitation.
Given a set of communication rules R, we say that k′ ∈ K is reachable from k ∈ K via R if k′ is the
result of applying all rules in R to k at most once; i.e. k′ = fR(k) where
Definition 2 fR : K −→ K such that
fR(k) = k ∪

(pa, v) :
(pb, v) ∈ k, ka ⊆ k, and
(pb, v, pa, ka) ∈ R,
for some pb ∈ P and ka ∈ K

 .
A state of knowledge kn is reachable in the context of a knowledge flow (R, k0) if kn = fnR(k0). The
maximal state of knowledge f∗R(k0) is the limit of kn = fnR(k0) as n → ∞. A state of knowledge f∗Rκ(κ)
is valid for a knowledge flow (R, k0) if Rκ ⊆ R and κ ⊆ k0. Since fR(k0) is monotonically increasing2 in
R and k0, any valid state of knowledge is a subset of the maximal state of knowledge. Hence, the maximal
state of knowledge is also the smallest fixed point of fR which subsumes k0.
4.2 Initial Knowledge
For each value v, Source(v) = {p : (p, v) ∈ k0} defines the set of principals who draw v. In the knowledge
flow framwork, a principal p outside of Source(v) can learn v only by communicating with principals
who know v. We therefore treat cryptographic primitives, and other computationally feasible algorithms,
as principals. For example, suppose that, in practice, p can compute v by applying the algorithm A to
inputs i1, i2, . . . , in. We model A by adding the principal A to P , the tuple (A, v) to k0, and the rule
(A, v, p, {(p, i1), (p, i2), . . . (p, in)}) to R.
Our treatment of primitives ensures that Knowledge(k0) = {v : (p, v) ∈ k0 for some p ∈ P} consists
of all learnable values. Hence, V is the same in the initial and the maximal state of knowledge,
Knowledge(k0) = Knowledge(f
∗
R(k0)), (4)
which implies that we can safely restrict our analysis to the subset of R applicable to k0. Formally,
(4) =⇒ fR(k0) = fR(k0)(k0) and f
∗
R(k0) = f
∗
R(k0)
(k0),
where R(k0) =
{
(pb, x, pa, ka) ∈ R :
{x} ∪ {v : (pa, v) ∈ ka}
⊆ Knowledge(k0)
}
.
2It is evident from Definition 2 that self-rules such as r = (p, v, p, kp) ∈ R do not affect the flow of knowledge: fR(k) =
fR−{r}(k). We therefore assume that R does not contain any self-rules.
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4.3 Adversaries’ Knowledge
Let O ⊆ P be a group of collaborating adversaries. We collapse O into a single principal o using the
following merging function:
Merge(p) =
{
o if p ∈ O,
p if p 6∈ O
Merge(k) = {(Merge(p), v) : (p, v) ∈ k}
Merge(r) = (Merge(pb), v,Merge(pa),Merge(ka))
where r = (pb, v, pa, ka) ∈ R
The merging of adversaries does not rule out any attacks because Merge(f∗R(k0)) ⊆ f∗Merge(R)(Merge(k0)).
We subsequently assume that Merge is implied and use P , R, and k0 to refer to Merge(P ), Merge(R),
and Merge(k0).
Security properties of protocols are expressed as predicates on the values known to Oscar in the maximal
state of knowledge. We therefore restrict our analysis of knowledge flows to finding all the values in the
projection of f∗
R(k0)
(k0) on Oscar. Specifically, we introduce the projection function gR,k0 and show that its
smallest fixed point is the image of Oscar under f∗
R(k0)
(k0).
Definition 3 Let X → x denote the existence of a rule (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ R(k0) for some p ∈ P − {o} and
kσ ∈ K with X = {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ}. We define gR,k : 2V −→ 2V as
gR,k0(X) = X ∪ {x : Xσ → x for some Xσ ⊆ X} .
The set of values reachable from X is given by g∗R,k0(X), which is the limit of gnR,k0(X) as n→∞.
Since fR(k0) is monotonically increasing inR and k0, Oscar’s pool of values under f∗R(k0) is maximized
if (a) Oscar tells everything he knows to the honest principals and (b) the honest principals tell everything
they know to each other. Therefore, (P − {o})×Knowledge(k0) should be included in the maximal state
of knowledge. This is equivalent to assuming that each honest principal draws Knowledge(k0) because
k ⊆ f∗R(k0) implies that f∗R(k0) = f∗R(k0 ∪ k).
Lemma 4 Let [(P − {o}) × V0] ⊆ k0 with V0 = Knowledge(k0) and let kn = fnR(k0). Then there exists
a unique set Xn ⊆ V such that
kn = [(P − {o})× V0] ∪ [{o} ×Xn]. (5)
The set Xn has the property that Xn = gnR,k0(X0).
Proof.
We use induction on n. For n = 0, Xn = X0 = gnR,k0(X0). Since (P − {o}) × V0 ⊆ k0 and
V0 = Knowledge(k0), there exists a unique X0 such that k0 satisfies (5).
Let Xn = gnR(X0) be a unique solution to (5) and
Knowledge(kn) = V0 (our induction hypothesis). We know that kn+1 = fR(kn) and, therefore, Knowledge(kn+1) =
Knowledge(kn) = V0. Together with [(P − {o}) × V0] ⊆ kn ⊆ kn+1, this implies the existence a unique
Xn+1 for which kn+1 satisfies (5). We now need to prove that Xn+1 = gn+1R,k0(X0).
Definition (5) lets us infer that x ∈ Xn+1 ⇐⇒ (o, x) ∈ kn+1 = fR(kn). According to Definition
(2), (o, x) ∈ fR(kn) if and only if i) (o, x) ∈ kn, which is, by (5), equivalent to x ∈ Xn, or ii) there
exists a p ∈ P and kσ ∈ K such that (p, x) ∈ kn, kσ ⊆ kn, and (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ R. Since there are no
self-rules (o, v, o, kσ) ∈ R, we know that p ∈ P − {o}. This, together with x ∈ Xn+1 ⊆ V0, implies that
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(p, x) ∈ [(P − {o}) × V0] ⊆ kn. Given [(P − {o}) × V0] ⊆ kn and V0 = Knowledge(kn), the condition
kσ ⊆ kn is equivalent to
Xσ = {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ} ⊆ {v : (o, v) ∈ kn} = Xn and
{v : (o, v) ∈ kσ} ⊆ V0.
Since x ∈ Xn+1 ⊆ V0, {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ} ⊆ V0 gives us (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ R(k0). Therefore, case ii) holds if
and only if there exists a set Xσ ⊆ Xn such that Xσ → x. By Definition (3), case i) or case ii) holds if and
only if x ∈ gR,k0(Xn). Hence, Xn+1 = gR,k0(Xn) and the lemma follows by induction on n.

4.4 Detecting Intruders
Let m be the total number of values used in a single protocol session, including the subterms of each
composite value. Suppose that Oscar can use only the primitives which compose or decompose inputs
and for which the composition rules have no collisions (e.g encryptor/decryptor). Then, the theory in [41]
implies the following: if there exists an attack in which Oscar uses w parallel protocol sessions, then such
an attack need not involve more than w ·m values. From (4) we infer that this corresponds to a valid state of
knowledge f∗R(kσ) derived from the set kσ ⊆ k0 of cardinality |Knowledge(kσ)| ≤ wm. By Lemma 4, we
can conclusively decide whether there is an attack which uses w parallel protocol sessions by computing
{
v ∈ g∗R,kσ(Xσ) :
for [{o} ×Xσ] ⊆ kσ ⊆ k0
with |Knowledge(kσ)| ≤ wm
}
. (6)
5 Evaluation
We have applied the theory developed in the previous section to check the security of the original [36] and
modified [28] Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol, the Otway-Rees Mutual Authentication Protocol
[40], and the bootstrapping and renewal protocols based on Controlled Physical Random Functions (CPUFs)
[20; 21].
The knowledge flows of the protocols were embedded into Alloy using the pattern presented in section
3. The pattern is embodied in a general Alloy framework for knowledge flow analysis which includes
definitions of basic concepts (Model Excerpt 1), a library of primitives, and a model outline for specifying
protocol rules and security theorems. For example, Model Excerpt 2 shows portions of Alloy modules that
encode generic encryption/decryption and nonce generator primitives, and Model Excerpts 3 and 4 comprise
an instantiation of the modelling outline for the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
We have found that the Alloy framework and its associated tool support make the process of knowledge
flow modelling fast, simple, and accurate. Our analysis is sound and, since most cryptographic primitives
used in practice are composing/decomposing, we can make it complete for a bounded number of parallel
sessions by applying the results from section 4.4. In the case of the modified Needham-Schroeder protocol,
for example, we have proved that it is secure against all attacks that use two parallel sessions. The analysis
of the Otway-Rees protocol (Appendix A) produced the type flaw attack described in [8]. We found the
CUPFs protocols (Appendix B) to be secure for a single protocol session and, therefore, for an unlimited
number of sessions.
The main limitation of our approach is that it is not fully general. As pointed out in section 4.1, protocols
that withhold information under certain conditions cannot be formulated as knowledge flows. However, this
limitation does not significantly detract from practical usefulness of knowledge flow analysis: as far as we
know, few practical protocols contain information-withholding rules.
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6 Related Work
The first formalisms designed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols are belief logics such as BAN
logic [8], used by the Convince tool [27] with the HOL theorem prover [24], and its generalizations (GNY
[23], AT [3], and SVO logic [44] which the C3PO tool [15] employs with the Isabelle theorem prover [39]).
Belief logics are difficult to use since the logical form of a protocol does not correspond to the protocol itself
in an obvious way. Almost indistinguishable formulations of the same problem lead to different results. It
is also hard to know if a formulation is over constrained or if any important assumptions are missing. BAN
logic and its derivatives cannot deal with security flaws resulting from interleaving of protocol steps [7] and
cannot express any properties of protocols other than authentication [30]. To overcome these limitations,
the knowledge flow formalism has, like other approaches [12; 29; 32; 35; 43], a concrete operational model
of protocol execution. Our model also includes a description of how the honest participants in the protocol
behave and a description of how an adversary can interfere with the execution of the protocol.
Specialized model checkers such as Casper [29], Murφ [35], Brutus [12], TAPS [13], and ProVerif [1]
have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. Like knowledge flow analysis in Alloy, these
tools are based on state space exploration which leads to an exponential complexity. Athena [43] is based
on a modification of the strand space model [18]. Even though it reduces the state space explosion problem,
it remains exponential. Multiset rewriting [17] in combination with tree automata is used in Timbuk [19].
The relation between multiset rewriting and strand spaces is analyzed in [9]. The relation between multiset
rewriting and process algebras [2; 34] is analyzed in [5].
Proof building tools such as NRL, based on Prolog [32], have also been helpful for analyzing security
protocols. However, they are not fully automatic and often require extensive user intervention. Model
checkers lead to completely automated tools which generate counterexamples if a protocol is flawed. For
theorem-proving-based approaches, counterexamples are hard to produce.
For completeness, we note that if the initial knowledge of the intruder consists of a finite number of
explicit (non-parameterized, non-symbolic) values, then a polynomial time intruder detection algorithm can
be shown to exist using a generalization of the proof normalization arguments [4; 22; 31], which were
employed in [6; 37] and have been implemented in the framework [38]. However, in practice, the initial
knowledge of an intruder is unbounded and represented by a finite number of parameterized sets, each
having an infinite number of elements.
The key advantage of the knowledge flow approach over other formalisms is its simplicity and flexi-
bility. It is simple in the sense that the underlying mathematics is straightforward and elementary; it does
not require any specialized background (in logic). It is flexible in the sense that the same library of cryp-
tographic primitives can be used to model different protocols and that the security of a complex scheme
involving multiple protocols can be verified. Knowledge Flow Analysys allows modeling of confidentiality
and authenticity via a wide range of primitives such as pairing, union, hashing, symmetric key encryption,
public key encryption, MACs and digital signatures.
Our formalism derives its simplicity from being just sufficiently expressive to enable modelling of prac-
tical cryptographic protocols. In particular, existentials [17] cannot be encoded as knowledge flows; existen-
tials are implicitly modeled in Oscar’s initial knowledge. As mentioned in Section (4.1), NP-hardness proofs
which use (existential) Horn clause reduction [17] or SAT3 reduction [41] are not applicable to Knowledge
Flow Analysis.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new method for formalizing and checking security protocols. Our approach enables
natural encoding of protocol rules, simple treatment of primitives, direct embedding into first order logic,
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and sound analysis that is also complete for many practical protocols.
We have developed a general framework for analyzing knowledge flows using the Alloy Analyzer. The
framework has been used to generate easily understandable knowledge flow representations of parallel ses-
sion and type flaw attacks on the Needham-Schroeder and Otway-Rees protocols. We have also instantiated
it with the rules for CPUFs key management protocols and verified the protocols’ correctness for an unlim-
ited number of parallel sessions.
We believe that knowledge flow analysis may be polynomial-time decidable for some protocols. Future
work will involve identifying the class of protocols whose knowledge flows are analyzable in polynomial
time and developing a specialized tool for checking them.
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Appendix A The Otway-Rees Protocol
1 module kf/otwayreese
2 open kf/basicdeclarations
3 open kf/primitives/encryption
4 open kf/primitives/nonces
16
56 sig Message extends CompositeValue {
7 contents: some Value }
8
9 sig Identity extends AtomicValue {}
10
11 pred PrimitiveRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
12 Encryptor(x,v) || Decryptor(x,v) || NonceGenerator(x,v) ||
13 (x : Message && v in x.contents) }
14
15 pred idCipher(cipher: Value) {
16 cipher : Ciphertext &&
17 some cipher.key.id & cipher.plaintext &&
18 cipher.plaintext in Identity &&
19 one cipher.plaintext - cipher.key.id }
20
21 pred keyCipher(cipher: Value) {
22 cipher : Ciphertext &&
23 some cipher.key.id }
24
25 pred message1(m: Value) {
26 m : Message &&
27 let cipher = m.contents & Ciphertext | {
28 idCipher(cipher) &&
29 m.contents = cipher + cipher.plaintext }}
30
31 pred message2(m: Value) {
32 m : Message &&
33 some cipher1 : Ciphertext |
34 let cipher2 = m.contents & Ciphertext - cipher1 | {
35 idCipher(cipher1) &&
36 idCipher(cipher2) &&
37 cipher1.plaintext = cipher2.plaintext &&
38 m.contents = cipher1 + cipher2 + cipher1.plaintext }}
39
40 pred message3(m: Value) {
41 m : Message &&
42 some cipher1 : Ciphertext |
43 let cipher2 = m.contents & Ciphertext - cipher1 | {
44 keyCipher(cipher1) &&
45 keyCipher(cipher2) &&
46 cipher1.plaintext = cipher2.plaintext &&
47 m.contents = cipher1 + cipher2 }}
48
49 pred message4(m: Value) {
50 m : Message &&
17
51 keyCipher(m.contents) }
52
53 pred ProtocolRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
54 (x : some Oscar.draws && message1(v)) ||
55 (message1(x) && message2(v) && x.contents in v.contents) ||
56 (message2(x) && message3(v) && x.contents.key = v.contents.key) ||
57 (message3(x) && message4(v) && v.contents in x.contents) }
58
59 pred ApplyRules() {
60 all v : Value | let x = Oscar.learns.v |
61 some x <=> PrimitiveRules(x, v) || ProtocolRules(x, v) }
62
63 pred SecurityAssumptions(){
64 PerfectCryptography() &&
65 all p : Principal | some p.owns & Identity }
66
67 pred SecurityTheorem() {
68 no oldResp, newResp : PUFResponse,
69 renew : param.(oldResp.isRespTo) & HonestUser,
70 cipher : Ciphertext |
71 let oldChall = oldResp.isRespTo, newChall = newResp.isRespTo |
72 oldChall.isHashOf : some (AtomicValue - Oscar.draws) &&
73 cipher.key.isHashOf = oldResp + renew.hash &&
74 cipher.plaintext = newResp &&
75 newChall.isHashOf = oldChall + renew.hash &&
76 newResp in Oscar.knows }
77
78 assert Security {
79 InitialKnowledge() && FinalKnowledge() &&
80 SecurityAssumptions() && ApplyRules() => SecurityTheorem() }
81
82 pred SecurityTheorem() {
83 no m1, m2, m3, m4: Oscar.knows & Message,
84 A, B: HonestUser.owns & Identity | {
85 message1(m1) && message2(m2) &&
86 message3(m3) && message4(m4) &&
87 m1.contents.key.id = A &&
88 m2.contents.key.id = A + B &&
89 m3.contents.key.id = A + B &&
90 m4.contents.key.id = A &&
91 m4.contents.plaintext in
92 (HonestUser.draws - Oscar.draws) & AtomicValue &&
93 m4.contents.plaintext in Oscar.knows }}
94
95 assert Security {
96 InitialKnowledge() && FinalKnowledge() &&
97 SecurityAssumptions() && ApplyRules() => SecurityTheorem() }
18
Appendix B The CUPF Renewal Protocol
1 module kf/primitives/hashing
2 open kf/basicdeclarations
3
4 sig Hash extends CompositeValue {
5 isHashOf: some Value }
6
7 pred CollisionFreeHashing() {
8 all disj h1, h2: Hash | h1.isHashOf != h2.isHashOf }
9
10 pred Hasher(x : set Value, v : Value) {
11 v in Hash && x = v.isHashOf }
12 module kf/cpufs
13 open kf/basicdeclarations
14 open kf/primitives/encryption
15 open kf/primitives/hashing
16
17 sig PUFResponse extends CompositeValue {
18 isRespTo: Value }
19
20 pred UniquePUFResponses() {
21 all r: PUFResponse | r.isRespTo !in (PUFResponse - r).isRespTo }
22
23 sig RenewProg in Principal {
24 param : Value,
25 hash : AtomicValue & owns
26 }{ param + hash in draws + knows }
27
28 pred SecretsNotLeaked() {
29 no (RenewProg & HonestUser).param.isHashOf & PUFResponse &&
30 (RenewProg & HonestUser).param in Hash }
31
32 pred GetResponsePrimitive(x : set Value, v : Value) {
33 v in PUFResponse &&
34 v.isRespTo.isHashOf = Oscar.hash + Oscar.param &&
35 x = v.isRespTo }
36
37 pred GetSecretPrimitive(x : set Value, v : Value) {
38 v in Hash &&
39 v.isHashOf = isRespTo.(Oscar.param) + Oscar.hash &&
40 x = v.isHashOf }
41
42 pred PrimitiveRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
43 Encryptor(x,v) || Decryptor(x,v) ||
44 GetResponsePrimitive(x,v) || GetSecretPrimitive(x,v) }
19
45
46 pred ProtocolRules(x : set Value, v : Value) {
47 x : some Oscar.draws && {
48 (v in (RenewProg & HonestUser).(param + hash)) ||
49 (v in Ciphertext &&
50 some renew: RenewProg & HonestUser |
51 let renewHash = renew.hash |
52 v.key.isHashOf = isRespTo.(renew.param) + renewHash &&
53 v.plaintext.isRespTo.isHashOf = renewHash + renew.param) }}
54
55 pred ApplyRules() {
56 all v : Value | let x = Oscar.learns.v |
57 some x <=> PrimitiveRules(x, v) || ProtocolRules(x, v) }
58
59 pred SecurityAssumptions(){
60 UniquePUFResponses() && PerfectCryptography() &&
61 SingleValueEncryption() && CollisionFreeHashing() &&
62 SecretsNotLeaked() }
63
64 pred SecurityTheorem() {
65 no disj oldResp, newResp : PUFResponse,
66 renew : param.(oldResp.isRespTo) & HonestUser,
67 cipher : Ciphertext |
68 let oldChall = oldResp.isRespTo, newChall = newResp.isRespTo |
69 oldChall.isHashOf : some (AtomicValue - Oscar.draws) &&
70 cipher.key.isHashOf = oldResp + renew.hash &&
71 cipher.plaintext = newResp &&
72 newChall.isHashOf = oldChall + renew.hash &&
73 newResp in Oscar.knows }
74
75 assert Security {
76 InitialKnowledge() && FinalKnowledge() &&
77 SecurityAssumptions() && ApplyRules() => SecurityTheorem() }
20
